Δευτέρα, Ιανουαρίου 30, 2006

Hamas, Palestine, and the Economics of Democracy--Posner

Hamas, Palestine, and the Economics of Democracy--Posner
30/1/06 5:04 pµ
<p>President Bush has suggested that spreading democracy is the surest antidote to Islamist terrorism. He can draw on a literature that finds that democracies very rarely go to war with each other, although a conspicuous exception is the U.S. Civil War, since both the Union and the Confederacy were democracies.</p>

http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2006/01/hamas_palestine.html

Hamas, Palestine, and the Economics of Democracy--Posner: "
President Bush has suggested that spreading democracy is the surest antidote to Islamist terrorism. He can draw on a literature that finds that democracies very rarely go to war with each other, although a conspicuous exception is the U.S. Civil War, since both the Union and the Confederacy were democracies.
Hamas, which has just won a majority in the parliament of the Palestinian proto-state, is a political party that has an armed terrorist wing and is pledged to the destruction of Israel. Can that surprising outcome of what appears to have been a genuinely free election be squared with the belief that democracy is the best antidote to war and terrorism?
The first thing to note is that one democratic election is not the equivalent of democracy. When Hitler in 1933 was asked by President Hindenburg to form a government, the processes of democracy appeared to be working. The Nazi Party was the largest party in the Reichstag; it was natural to invite its leader to form a government. Within months, Germany was a dictatorship. So the fact that Hamas has won power fairly and squarely does not necessarily portend the continuation of Palestinian democracy.
But suppose Palestine remains democratic. What can we look forward to? I don't think the question is answerable if democracy is analyzed realistically. The great economist Joseph Schumpeter sketched in his 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy what has come to be called the theory of "elite" or "procedural" or "competitive" democracy. In this concept, which I have elaborated in my book Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003), and which seems to me descriptive of most modern democracies, including that of the United States, there is a governing class, consisting of people who compete for political office, and a citizen mass. The governing class corresponds to the selling side of an economic market, and the citizen mass to the consuming side. Instead of competing for sales, however, the members of the governing class compete for votes. The voters are largely ignorant of policy, just as consumers are ignorant of the inner workings of the products they buy. But the power of the electorate to turn elected officials out of office at the next election gives the officials an incentive to adopt policies that do not outrage public opinion and to administer the policies with some minimum of honesty and competence. It was Fatah's dramatic failure along these dimensions that opened the way to Hamas's surprisingly strong electoral showing. Hamas cleverly coupled armed resistance to Israel with the provision of social welfare services managed more efficiently and honestly than the services provided by the notoriously corrupt official Palestinian government, controlled by Fatah....
"

Κυριακή, Ιανουαρίου 29, 2006

The Very Top of the U.S. Income Distribution: "

Mark Thoma is wishing he had already found time to read Piketty and Saez (2006), "The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective" (Cambridge: NBER WP 11955:
Abstract: This paper summarizes the main findings of the recent studies that have constructed top income and wealth shares series over the century for a number of countries using tax statistics. Most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the century due to a precipitous drop in large wealth holdings during the wars and depression shocks. Top income shares do not recover in the immediate post war decades. However, over the last 30 years, top income shares have increased substantially in English speaking countries but not at all in continental Europe countries or Japan. This increase is due to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes starting in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1990s. As a result, top wage earners have replaced capital income earners at the top of the income distribution in English speaking countries. We discuss the proposed explanations and the main questions that remain open.
Thoma reproduces what are by far the most interesting figures in Piketty and Saez, which show that the pretax income share of the top 1% of the American income distribution jumped from 8% in 1980 to 9% in 1985 to 13% in 1990 to 17% in 2000 to 14% today. Over the same period the income share of the next 4% has risen from 13% to 15%, and the income share of the still next 5% has stayed at 12%. The top tenth of the American income distribution increased its share from 33% in 1980 to 41% today--with three-quarters of that increase going to the top 1% and fully one-quarter of that increase going to the top 0.01%.
What skills and assets do the top 1% of America's pretax income distribution have today that lead the market to grant them 14% of total income, when their counterparts back in 1980 were granted only 8% of total income? What skills and assets do the top 0.01% of the American pretax income distribution--that's 12,000 tax units--that led the market to grant them 100 times average income in 1980, and 300 times average income today?…

"

Σάββατο, Ιανουαρίου 28, 2006

Tο 1961 οι πλούσιες χώρες υποσχέθηκαν στις φτωχότερες να τους παρέχουν βοήθεια ίση με το 0,7% του AEΠ τους. Σήμερα, μόλις πέντε χώρες τηρούν αυτή την υπόσχεση

Στο νέο μου βιβλίο «Το Τέλος της Φτώχειας» παρουσιάζω το πώς μπορεί να αντιμετωπιστεί, έως το 2025, η εξαθλίωση. Αυτό, όμως, μπορεί να γίνει μόνον αν τα πλούσια κράτη πραγματοποιήσουν την υπόσχεσή τους να βοηθήσουν τις φτωχότερες χώρες. Μια οικονομία για να ευδοκιμήσει και να αποδεχθεί τις ιδιωτικές επενδύσεις που είναι τόσο απαραίτητες για την ανάπτυξη μακροπρόθεσμα, πρέπει να έχει συστήματα υγειονομικής περίθαλψης και κοινωνικής ασφάλισης που να λειτουργούν. Χρειάζεται χρήματα για τη γεωργία και επενδύσεις, ώστε να εξασφαλίζεται η ύπαρξη πόσιμου νερού. Ακόμη, πρέπει να υπάρχουν βασικές υποδομές, όπως είναι ο ηλεκτρισμός και οι δημόσιες συγκοινωνίες. Οι φτωχότερες χώρες, όμως, ακόμη και αυτές στις οποίες η διακυβέρνηση είναι χρηστή, δεν έχουν τους πόρους για να χρηματοδοτήσουν τέτοιες επενδύσεις.
Μεγάλη ντροπή
H έλλειψη επαρκούς εξωτερικής βοήθειας είναι η μεγαλύτερη ντροπή για τον πλανήτη - και αυτό ισχύει περισσότερο για τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες. Οι ΗΠΑ θα πρέπει να συνειδητοποιήσουν άμεσα τις ανάγκες που υπάρχουν στον κόσμο και να πραγματοποιήσουν όλα όσα έχουν υποσχεθεί. H πιο σημαντική υπόσχεση που έχουν δώσει οι πλούσιες χώρες στις φτωχότερες, είναι να τους παρέχουν βοήθεια ίση με το 0,7% του ΑΕΠ τους. H δέσμευση αυτή πραγματοποιήθηκε πριν από 44 χρόνια, το 1961, όταν ο ΟΗΕ υιοθέτησε ψήφισμα για σημαντική αύξηση της εξωτερικής βοήθειας (προς τις φτωχότερες χώρες του κόσμου), με στόχο η βοήθεια αυτή «να φθάσει το συντομότερο δυνατό περίπου το 1% του συνολικού εθνικού εισοδήματος των οικονομικά ανεπτυγμένων χωρών». Εκείνο τον καιρό, αυτή η βοήθεια έφθανε περίπου το 0,5% του εισοδήματος των ανεπτυγμένων οικονομιών. ...

Πέμπτη, Ιανουαρίου 26, 2006

Private vs. government funding of science: "
Arthur Diamond offers this abstract:Regression analysis is used to test the effects of funding source (and of various control variables) on the importance of the article, as measured by the number of citations that the article receives. Funding source...
"
Why is U.S. Productivity Strong Relative to Europe?: "
Hal Varian argues that a primary factor in explaining the U.S. productivity advantage in recent years is more effective use of information technology. Chris Giles of the Financial Times follows up with a discussion of this and other influences on...
"
What China Can Learn from India: "
Yasheng Huang from the MIT Sloan School of Management says China could learn a thing or two from India about economic development. He believes India will outperform China in the next few decades unless China embarks on bold institutional reforms:...
"
Hausman on Wal-Mart and Welfare: "
Interesting... Econ professor illustrates benefits of Wal-Mart, PressZoom: Economics Professor Jerry Hausman placed the cooling hand of numbers on ... notions about Wal-Mart's economic impact in an IAP session titled, The Consumer Benefits From Increased …
"
The Evolution of Top Incomes: "
I haven't had a chance to read this yet, but I hope to: The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective, by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, NBER WP 11955, January 2006: Abstract This paper summarizes the main...
"
Greenspan Opposes Wal-Mart's Banking Plans: "
There are limits to Greenspan's free-market tendencies after all: Greenspan Opposes Bank Loophole, by Bernard Wysocki Jr., WSJ: Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan is opposing a regulatory loophole that allows corporations to own banks, thrusting …
"
Soaring commodity prices: "
Is U.S. monetary policy behind the surge in commodity prices?
"

Impressive run-ups in the price of oil and natural gas over the last 5 years have kept energy markets in the headlines. But it is difficult not to see this also as related in part to a broader movement in commodity prices generally. As these graphs from Kitco Base Metals reveal, the dollar price of copper, aluminum, zinc, and nickel have all basically doubled over the last three years.

Jeffrey Frankel, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, argues that U.S. monetary policy may be part of the explanation. Low real interest rates, he notes, lower the cost of carrying physical inventories and increase the attractiveness of speculating in commodities relative to holding Treasury bills. He documents an impressive historical correlation as revealed by the scatter diagram at the left: those years in which the real interest rate was lowest tended also to be years in which commodity prices were high relative to other prices.